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* * *

WAL-MART V. DUKES:
Is 1.6 Million Women 0.6 Million
too Many?
BEGIN TRANSCRIPT:
SUSANNA BIRDSONG: Thank you so much for being here. My
name is Susanna Birdsong and I am the Symposium Editor of the Labor
and Employment Law Forum. I would first like to thank our co-hosts
for this event, the Women and the Law Program and the Women’s Law
Association. I would especially like to thank Angie McCarthy for all of
her hard work in helping us put this event together.
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: Good afternoon and welcome
to the Washington College of Law. As I am a Federal Government
Employee, please note that my appearance today is of a personal, rather
than a professional nature. Therefore any views expressed are my own,
and are not the views of the Federal Government.
Today we are going to talk about a very hot issue—the largest civil
rights class action ever filed. So let us talk a little bit about Betty Dukes
and a group of women who decided to take on the behemoth Wal-Mart.1
When they filed their suit over ten years ago as a class action, they

1.
Kenneth Jost, Class Action Lawsuits: Will the Supreme Court Approve the WalMart Case?, 19 CQ Researcher No. 19, May 13, 2011, (describing Betty Dukes slow and
incremental progress from part-time cashier to greater of the course of seventeen years and
how it relates to the experiences of many women working at Wal-Mart).
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raised two straight-forward claims.2 Their first claim was that Wal-Mart
paid women workers less than male workers in comparable positions,
despite the women having superior performance and seniority.The
second [claim was] that Wal-Mart promoted men more frequently than
. . . women [who were equally or better qualified].
The class was defined in a 2003 Motion for Class Certification as, “All
women employed at Wal-Mart from December 26, 1998 to the present
who had been subjected to Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion policies and
practices.”3 This sounds fairly simple but this is a case of staggering
proportions, as the class of women workers may total over 1.5 million.
4
Wal-Mart,5 as I said before, is the largest employer in the world,
with over one million employees.6 So the class sought injunctive and
declaratory relief to compel Wal-Mart to stop its current policies and
practices and to prevent future discrimination, in addition to back pay
and punitive damages. The class itself waved any right to compensatory
damages.
Now, the average back pay claim for the women who are hourly
workers [and] managers would total about $11,000 per person. [Now,
c]ompare that to Wal-mart’s . . . assets [whick total over $170 billion.
So, it was said yesterday in court that this case is kind of a “David
versus Goliath” story.7 It is actually better said as a “Betty versus Goliath”
story. Wal-Mart has actually characterized the case in the Class’s attempt
to get certification as being “historic in nature”—that assertion is true.
8
Wal-Mart argued that “the size alone of this case makes it impossible

2.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 131 U.S. 2541, 2563 (2011) (holding that evidence
presented by members of class did not rise to the level of significant proof that the company
acted under a general policy of discrimination).
3.
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 187 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding
that female employees of the Walmart retail store chain did not satisfy numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, which are required to certify as a
class under Title VII).
4.
See generally, Jost, supra note 1 (discussing Wal-mart’s contention that 1.5
million women possess too many differences to satisfy the class action requirements of
“commonality” and “typicality”).
5.
222 F.R.D. at 141 .
6.
Global 500: Top Companies Biggest Employers, CNN Money (July 23, 2012),
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2012/performers/
companies/biggest/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
7.
See id. (listing Wal-Mart as the largest global employer).
8.
See Martha Burk, Dukes v. Wal-Mart One Year Later: Where do Women Stand?,
Washington Post (June 17, 2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marthaburk/post_3504_b_1601449.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (noting that the class action
against Wal-Mart is the largest class action in United States’ history, with more than 1.5
million plaintiffs).
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for class certification.”9 In response, the district court noted that “Title
VII does not exempt large employers.”10
So in support of the motion for their class certification filing, the
plaintiffs presented statistical evidence at a regional level for the WalMart stores in their paid promotions and practices.11 They presented
declarations from 120 class members who testified to the lack of
uniformity of the pay and promotion policies and practices and to the
pervasive sexist stereotyping from the Wal-Mart corporate culture. And
the plaintiffs’ social science expert testified that Wal-Mart’s subjective
practices were vulnerable to sexual stereotyping.12
In opposition, Wal-Mart also presented its own statistical analysis at
a store-by-store level in which its expert found that there was no pay
disparity in more than ninety percent of their Wal-Mart stores.13 WalMart also challenged the plaintiffs’ anecdotal evidence as being limited
to a very small percentage of their 34,000 stores across the country, and
challenged the sociologist’s testimony as a mere conjecture. So evidence
from both sides was presented to the District Court.
The District Court in California certified the class for pay and promotion
claims in 2003.14 Four years later it went up to the Ninth Circuit,
which affirmed the class certification in substantial part.15 Three years
later, it went to the full Ninth Circuit en banc. En banc, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a substantial part the lower Court’s decision.16 They, however,
did decertify one piece of the class action, which was remanded back to
the District Court on the punitive damages issue. So that issue was not
before the Supreme Court during yesterday’s oral arguments.

9.
Principle Brief for the Petitioner, 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Ca. 2004) (arguing that
the size of the class exceeds the population of at least twelve of the fifty states)..
10.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 142 (N.D. Ca. 2004)
(determining Title VII contains no special exemptions for large employers).
11.
See Brief for Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 25411
(2011) (noting that the under-selecction for women as Department Heads had merely a one
in seven hundred chance of occurring randomly).
12.
See Brief for Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 25411
(2011) (describing senior officer’s practice of referring to female employees as “Janie Qs”
and “girls” and of authorizing the holding of management meetings at Hooters restaurants).
13.
See Brief for Respondent at 4, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541
(2011) (describing the assertion of Wal-Mart’s expert, Joan Haworth, that “more than 90%
of the stores had no pay rate differences between men and women that were statistically
significant”).
14.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (2004) (upholding the
class certification as it satisfied the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
requirements).
15.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007) (determining
that despite the size of the class, the class action could proceed in a manner both manageable
and in accordance with due process requirements).
16.
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9h Cir. 2011) (upholding the
district court’s class certification but determining the district court abused its discretion by
certifying the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claims as a separate class for equitable relief).
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So the two issues before the U.S. Supreme Court are procedural. The
first issue is whether the order certifying the class comports with Rule
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.17 And, the second [issue]
is whether the claims for monetary relief can be certified under Rule
23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, if so, under what
circumstance?18
So our distinguished panel today will address these issues and the
arguments before the Court. Most significantly, we will also discuss
the potential impact of this decision not only in the employment
discrimination area but also as it pertains to class actions. I hope to also
address some of the pretty dramatic implications raised by several of the
questions from the Justices during the oral argument.
RICHARD UGELOW: I am going to talk in the most general terms
in the five or six minutes that have been allocated to me to give some
context to this litigation.
First, I will talk about the background of Title VII, the potential
impact of the Wal-Mart decision, and the enforcement scheme set about
by Title VII. So Wal-Mart, as you have heard, is an action to enforce
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.19
What is Title VII? Title VII is the major Federal Civil Rights Act that
prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion,
gender, color and national origin. It covers everything except age and
disability, as there are other statutes that cover those specializations.20
Lastly, it was the first major piece of anti-discrimination in employment
legislation.
So let me set the stage of what the employment situation in this
country looked like prior to the enactment of Title VII in 1964. Up on
the board, I do not know if you can see it, we had sex segregated jobs
and we had race segregated jobs. I have put up here some examples of
advertisements from either the Washington Post or the New York Times.
This one from 1964 shows separate job classified ads for men or for

17.
Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a) (requiring that the size of the class makes joinder
impracticable, there are questions of law or fact common to the class, the claims and
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class,
and the representative parties “fairly and adequately” protect the interests of the class).
18.
Fed R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (maintaining that the opposing party acted or refused to
act on grounds applicable to the class as a whole, making injunctive relief applicable to the
class as a whole)..
19.
See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (as amended)
(proclaiming discrimination based upon race, color, sex, religion, and national origin to be
illegal).
20.
See The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(as amended) (prohibiting discrimination in employment because of physical and mental
disability); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
(as amended) (forbidding employment discrimination against anyone over the age of forty
years of age).
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women.21 There were also separate job ads for whites and for “Negroes,”
which blacks were called at that time. Most of the advertisements for
women were for jobs like waitressing, nursing and teaching. The jobs for
men often involved heavy labor. During this time in the United States,
many states had statutes that prohibited women from lifting more than
forty pounds and from working a certain number of hours in a week.
So it was a pretty ugly situation for women and the impact of this
discrimination can be seen in the many professions. In an article in the
New York Times by Nicolas Kristof,22 he notes that many brilliant women
became teachers in the early 1960’s because of discrimination in other
fields. However, due to the progress that we have made as a society, more
women are now becoming brain surgeons, lawyers, and accountants and
have a whole range of job opportunities. The article also argues that the
current shift by women to other professions, possibly due to low pay
for teachers, has caused the teaching profession and our school system
to suffer.23 While the current shift into other professions is voluntary,
the overt discriminatory job segregation of the 1960’s still continues to
affect our society.
Where are we today? Well, what happened when Title VII was
enacted? The statute did not magically heal the whole nation. There
was no level playing field. What happened is that employers started
adding other qualifications to the jobs. For example, if you wanted
to be a security officer or a police officer you might have to be 5’7”
tall. What does that mean? Well, it means that many women were
disqualified from positions because they were not tall enough.24 Some
employers also started imposing a college education requirement. Well,
that disqualified minority groups from jobs because they did not have a
college education or educational system at that time.25
So we refer to these measures as facially neutral policies. They apply
to everyone regardless of race or gender, but they had a more definitive
impact on women or minorities depending on the job qualification that

21.
See William A. Darity Jr. and Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in
Employment: Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. Econ. Perspectives 63, 64 (1998)
(structuring help-wanted advertisements so as to explicitly separate job opportunities based
on gender).
22.
See Nicholas D. Kristof. Pay Teachers More, N.Y. Times, March 13, 2011, at
WK10 (citing a McKinsey & Co. study, saying that “these days, brilliant women become
surgeons and investment bankers—and forty-seven percent of America’s kindergarten
through twelfth grade teachers come from the bottom one- third of their college classes.”).
23.
See id. (citing McKinsey study which found that teachers in countries such as
South Korea, Singapore and Finland which are known for their educational performance
are highly paid, are well respected and earn more on average than lawyers and engineers).
24.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that Title VII prohibits the
application of statutory height and weight requirements to disadvantage a protected class).
25.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (determining that the
higher education requirement was an articifical and unnecessary barrier to employment
opportunities for minorities, violating Title VII).
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was imposed.26 So you could argue, as I would, that these initial job
qualification facilitated continued discrimination by excluding women
or minorities from certain jobs.
So that, in a very thumbnail way, is the employment picture as of 1964.
So then the question is, “How do you correct the bad policies from these
decades of overt and what was lawful job discrimination?” Well, this
can be done in two ways. A woman who was not 5’7” and wants to be a
police officer in Philadelphia or Washington, D.C. can sue individually
for a remedy. The other option is to get together as a group and file as a
class to challenge the facially neutral practice that really has no bearing
on one’s ability to perform the job.
So I think you can see how objective it is to have class actions or
group types of litigation lawsuits to challenge these facially neutral but
yet discriminatory employment practices. That is the situation of the
Dukes v. Wal-Mart plaintiffs. They allege that Wal-Mart’s employment
practices has the effect of discriminating against them and denying them
protected job benefits.
Then the question is, “Who would enforce Title VII?” Well, Congress
set up two methods in the Federal Government, more specifically, in
the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission—both of which had litigating authority in 197227. So the
EEOC had the individual cases of intentional discrimination, or what are
known as challenges to patterns or practices of unlawful discrimination,
like a height requirement [or] like a college education [requirement] for
employment.
So these suits were brought in the name of the United States Attorney
General—so it is the United States versus the defendant. Since the
government has limited resources, Congress in Title VII said, “we
should allow the private sector, the private attorneys, to enforce Title
VII.”28 And these private attorneys became known as private attorneys
general because they brought class action litigation and challenged the
policies that discriminated against women or minorities.29 In the statute,
Congress said, “private attorneys general who are successful can receive
26.
See id. at 429 (establishing disparate impact theory which states that practices
while neutral on their face cannot be maintained if the operate to “freeze the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices”).
27.
Equal Employment Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2009) (establishing an
investigative and judicial body that analyzes charges of discrimination against employers
covered by the statute and occasionally files a lawsuit in furtherance of the individual’s
interest).
28.
See Overview, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (establishing a procedure which allows
either the Commission or a private to bring a suit on behalf of an employee, protected under
federal law, who was discriminated against because of his/her membership in a protected
class).
29.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), (g) (providing injunctions, appropriate affirmative
action, equitable relief, back pay, and attorneys fees upon a finding that the respondent
intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice).
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attorneys fees and be compensated for their work.” So there is a two-leg
approach to enforcement: the federal government and private attorneys
general.
Wal-Mart, depending on this decision, may knock out the private
attorneys general enforcement leg. If you cannot bring class actions, you
cannot [effect] systemic change and obtain attorneys fees. Consequently,
attorneys are less likely to take on these cases.
Now you can say that the federal government should handle all of
these matters, but the federal government has limited resources to bring
these suits. The federal government is not subject to class certification,
as the Department of Justice and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission can bring cases on a self-starting basis.30 They are not
affected by class action and if a pattern or practice of discrimination
is identified by either agency, the Department of Justice or the EEOC
could initiate the litigation. We would not be here talking if that class
certification issue, if this case had been brought by a federal agency. We
might be talking about something else like whether there is a pattern or
practice of discrimination. But we would not be talking about the class
certification issue.
Finally, I would like to point out that the size of the class, the
Government in the past, the Department of Justice in particular, has
brought massive class actions under a pattern of practice claim. For
example, every steel company in the United States has been sued by
the Department of Justice—this consists of thousands upon thousands
of cases.31 The entire major trucking industry has been sued by the
Department of Justice—again with thousands and thousands of litigants.
Both outcomes resulting in many millions of dollars in back pay.32
So you ask, “well, how was this dealt with?” Well, the Supreme
Court created a mechanism in the case of Teamsters v United States
for addressing these large class action or patterns or practices of
discrimination.33 It is a two-stage process. Stage one is the determination
of liability. Is the defendant, (the steel industry, the trucking company, and
Wal-Mart) responsible? Did it violate Federal law? Did it discriminate?
30.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (empowering the Equal Opportunity Commission
with the power “to prevent any person from engaging in nay unlawful employment practice
as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title”).
31.
See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Aff., Justice Department Settles
Allegations of Immigration-Related Employment Discrimination Against Summit Steel
Fabricators in Houston , Justice.gov (Aug. 10, 2011) (reaching a settlement agreement
to resolve allegations that the company engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination
against non-citizens).
32.
See, e.g., Clarification: Sexual Harassment - Truckers Story, Seattle Press
(April 11, 2012), available at http://www.seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2017960191_
apussexualharassmenttruckers.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2012) (describing the suit brought
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on behalf of female workers who
claim they were sexually harassed by mail trainers at an Iowa trucking company).
33.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977) (requiring the government
to prove by a preponderance oof the evidence that the alleged discrimination was the
company’s standard operating procedure).
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If so, stage two creates the mechanism to have individual hearings to
determine individual liability.
Now that does not only include money—that is the issue at Wal-Mart
but if you look at the trucking industry and the steel industry it was not
only money but also seniority. It was length of service. This is as equally
important to the employees as money. Perhaps we can talk about that
later. There is also a mechanism for that.
LLEZLIE GREEN COLEMAN: So my role on this panel is to talk
a little bit about class actions. I will talk about how plaintiffs approach
it; and how a case becomes a class action. I will just mention that prior
to coming to Washington College of Law, I was actually at Cohen
Milstein Sellers and Toll and did minimal work on the Wal-Mart case.
In an interesting aside, the case was actually filed and the class was
certified when I first started at the firm in 2004. It hit the Ninth Circuit
in December of 2004 and we are just now seeing an argument in the
Supreme Court. So you can see how long this process takes.
What are class actions? Class actions are cases where attorneys have
discovered discrimination, usually through having individuals come
to them complaining about individual discrimination. These attorneys
continue to hear a very similar story from people all across the country.
So it is not “oh, here is a company we think there is a problem that needs
to be investigated.” These individuals are coming to attorneys and saying,
“we are not being paid. We suspect that we are not being paid as much.”
And in the case of Wal-Mart, women are not being paid as much as men.
They are claiming that “[we are] not being paid as much as other men.
[We are] not being promoted.” They are putting you in touch with other
individuals who are basically saying that the same thing is happening
across the board and you start investigating in real life and across the
States and in every region where you are hearing the same types of
stories. So that is the genesis for how class actions form.
The idea behind the class action is that these cases can best be
adjudicated by joining all of these claimants together.34 They are cohesive
enough that the policy that they are challenging exists all across the
company and all across the country. These stories are the same; you find
statistically significant disparities in pay or promotions all across the
country and as a result these cases could be adjudicated as one class.
Thus, there is some judicial economy to addressing all of these issues
as a class instead of relegating it to hundreds or thousands or in this

34.
See Why Class Actions, Zimmerman Reed, www.zimmreed.com/Why-ClassActions/16076/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2012) (finding class actions allow individuals who
experience a common injury to litigate their claim in an affordable and efficient manner, and
as such, class actions serve as a deterent to businesses because it holds them accountable
for committing multiple “minor” violations).
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case, millions of individuals for trial.35 So the idea is that they are bound
together cohesively in a class and are challenging a pattern or practice
that is occurring across the country or throughout that company.
Class actions are governed by Rule of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides that the plaintiff has to meet a certain burden
in order to establish that their class should be certified. In order for a
class to be certified it has to meet all the elements of Rule 23(a). These
elements include numerosity, which is that the idea that the class is so
large that joinder of all of its members would be impractical. Clearly
here no one is arguing that it would make more sense for 1.6 million
people to litigate each claim separately, so individual litigation is clearly
not feasible here. That really has not been contested, although it is also
noted in terms of how class action functions. There is no magic number.
So there is not, “oh, we have twenty people that can be a class or we
have fifty people that can be a class.” Courts have issued a number
of different opinions depending upon the particular circumstances in
deciding whether a class is large enough to be certified.
The second element is commonality and this provides that there must
be questions of law or facts that are common to the class. This means
that if you were to resolve these particular issues it would impact and
resolve an issue that is similar or exists for all of the members of this
adjudicated class.
The third element is typicality and that is the idea that claims of the
named plaintiffs have to be typical of the claims of the class. So they
cannot have some very unique claim that they are naming that would
not be the same as all of the other individuals that are part of this class.
The fourth element is an advocacy. This requires the named plaintiffs
to demonstrate that they and their counsel will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. If you have a very small firm or
individual, naturally they are going to have a problem in terms of
adequacy of counsel. The court could actually determine that such a
firm is not really in a position to represent the interests of this class of 1
million women across the country.
So in addition to those four elements of Rule 23(a), the Court also
has to meet either 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). Rule 23(b)(2) is really just the
issue here. Employee discrimination in class claims are usually certified
under 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) basically says that “the party upheld in
the class has to act or refuse to act on the grounds that are generally
applicable to the class so that final injunctive relief and corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.”
That is a relatively complicated way of saying that if you are looking
for injunctive or declaratory relief that would resolve this issue, all the
discrimination of women for the entire class or all of the individual
members, you have to verify the class under 23(b)(2). What is important
35.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (the court is to consider whether “a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controvery”).
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to note here when money becomes part of it, the concern is that if the
plaintiffs are seeking various back pay and punitive disabilities, punitive
damages are not certified.
Historically, being considered for equitable relief was based literally
on the idea that but for this discrimination this individual would have
been paid this amount of money.36 It is very different from compensatory
damages that may be based upon somebody’s individual emotional
response to discrimination. Compensatory damages typically involve
individualized hearings and are typically certified under Rule 23(b)(3),
which we will talk about in a moment. But there is another way for a
class to be certified, but cases for monetary relief are typically certified
under 23(b)(2). That is what has been challenged here today. In fact,
that is one of the more disturbing aspects of Wal-Mart’s challenges. The
company is arguing that the case should never be certified under Rule
23(b)(2).
23(b)(2) is also important because it is what we would call a
mandatory class. If you are certified under 23(b)(2) then every person
involved in the definition is part of this class. So the Court has decided
it is cohesive enough that we do not have to basically distribute that
notice to everyone who could possibly be a member and give them an
opportunity to remove themselves from the class.
Rule 23(b)(3) is another way that a class can be certified. It requires
that the plaintiffs pay for distributing the class notification. One plaintiff
must have the resources to send a notice to all of the individuals who
would be part of the class and give them an opportunity to say that,
“Well, my claim is special enough that I do not think that I should have
to proceed with this class action. I can just do this separately.”37 So 23(b)
(2) also has other elements that the plaintiff has to meet in order for the
class to be certified. They have to prove that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members. They also have to prove that the
class action is a superior mechanism to the other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.
Under 23(b)(3) you have to send out notice to allow the class members
the opportunity to opt out and remove themselves from the case, but that
is actually very costly. And I would maintain a loss technically is not
an element that has to be proven under Rule 23. What you will see now
is that our plaintiff also demonstrates manageability as an element of
discovery. Mangeability is the idea is that in order to address the court’s
concerns that this class action cannot be managed, you will not be able
36.
See Gary L. McDowell, Equity and the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, Equitable Relief, and Public Policy 9 (U. of Chicago Press, 1982) (comparing
the traditional understanding of equitable relief which focused on specific concrete rights,
especially property, with modern understanding of equitable relief which emphasized on
broad remedial mandates exercised in a prescriptive way).
37.
See Barbara J. Rothstein & Thomas E. Willging, Managing Class Action
Litigation: A Pocket Guide for Judges 11 (2010) (using adequate notice as a possible factor
in determining manageability factor of class certification)
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to figure out how to address all of these issues, and you will find that
clients actually put forward a trial plan as part of their effort to get a case
started. I think that that basically walks you through the element of class
certification that you have a sense of what the plaintiffs are trying to do.
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: Great. Thank you. Larry?
LARRY LORBER: Thanks. Before we do anything, let me just add
two, historical notes to Richard’s very appropriate historical setting, the
first of which is relevant to this case. [W]hen the Civil Rights Act [of]
1964 was passed, sex was not included within the civil rights package.
Committee from Virginia to the employment section of Title VII as a
means to defeat the bill because he thought that Congress would never
pass a law barring sex discrimination—and it was.38
Even more interesting is that the amendment was opposed by people
such as Eleanor Roosevelt who was also afraid that the inclusion of sex
inclusion would defeat the Civil Rights Act and also because the Equal
Pay Act39 was passed the year before in 1963.40 So it was viewed, for
whatever it was worth, that the law that would ensure equal treatment
for women in the workplace. So there was that additional factor which
sort of leads into my next point.
I will just add one further thing. I also came from the Government. I
was at the Labor Department and was involved with the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs, which is the Government agency that
ensures that employers doing business with the federal government
comply with laws and regulations that bar discrimination. When the
Executive Order was issued, sex was forgotten.41 The Order has since
been amended to require affirmative action on the basis of sex. 42
In this opening session, I just want to talk about the case from the
employer’s perspective. Let me begin by saying this. Sometimes bad
facts make bad law. And for a lot of reasons, it can be said that the WalMart case for various reasons is not the only case to address these issues
.
38.
See Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition
of Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. Hist. 37, 44-45
(1983) (describing how Martha Wright Griffiths, who defended Representative Howard
Smith’s amendment in the floor debate, recalled Smith explicitly teller her “the amendment
was a joke”).
39.
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006) (abolishing wage disparity
based on sex); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. (establishing
minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping,and child employment standards affecting
the private sectoras well as federal, state, and local governments).
40.
See Brauer, supra note 38 at 41 (mentioning that Eleanor Roosevelt served as the
chair of the President’s Commission on the Status of Women, which declared the equality
of rights for women under the law was already embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
41.
See Exec. Order No. 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303 (1967) (amending Executive
Order 11246 to include the word “sex”)..
42.
See id.
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Now the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a limited question. It
rejected most of the issues and the question to which cert was granted
was on whether the class certification order under Rule 23(b)(2) was
consistent with Rule 23(a).43 That is the only question before the Supreme
Court. Notwithstanding this argument, they went far beyond it, including
getting into the facts of the case. I think Justice Ginsberg appropriately
pointed out this issue and Justice Sotomayor went on to say “Well, wait
a second.” This is a low standard to get a class certification here. You
don’t argue facts in class. You argue, as Llezlie said, that you meet the
criteria of 23(a)—that is what you need to get a class. We will get to
23(b) in a moment. In a trial like this would involve a lot of expert
events both on statistics and sociologists and all the rest.
So that was what was before the Court yesterday? I would add on
that what happened yesterday, is that the Court meandered deeply into
the facts of this case. Now, it is difficult not to do this in some respects
because the issue is commonality. Was there a common practice or is the
purported class related to each other in a manner sufficient so that they
all could be considered to be in a class?
A secondary issue which came up which relates to 23(b)(2) as Llezlie
pointed out, once you are in a 23(b)(2) class you cannot get out of a (b)
(2) class. If you are deemed to be part of it, you are in it. The Court is
pondering whether or not if there was due process. Because you are
talking about $11,100 [per person], give or take [a few dollars], . . . of
back pay . . . times a million and a half, [t]hat is a lot of money. There
is also interest on this amount depending on how far you go back, how
long they worked there and so forth. So there are lots of computations
involved.
But once you are in a 23(b)(2) class you cannot get out of a 23(b)(2)
class. [W]hat is happening here is that you are talking about everything
in play at Wal-Mart since 2003 and 1998, but [this] still includes 544
women who were managers [and thus,] who were both the victims
and perpetrators of discrimination. [T]he argument presented was that
Wal-Mart both delegated authority to its managers to the extent that it
lost control over what the managers did, but that a policy of Wal-Mart
[was] that women could not be appropriate managers at Wal-Mart.The
other issue is that this class also included part-time employees as well
as full time employees; so, arguably they would not have been eligible
for a promotion in any case. Additionally, the class included employees
in every aspect of the Wal-Mart stores, including the meat cutters and
the shelf stockers.
From an employer’s point of view, when you are faced with this type
of class assertion, one key element to begin with is to try to parse down
the class so that you try to line up the purported class leaders with the

43.
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 795 (2010) (granting certiorari
to answer the question “Whether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was
consistent with Rule 23(a)”).
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purported class members. They have to be congruent with each other to
some extent. They do not all have to be the same but to some extent they
have to be lined up. Again, as Llezlie said, the class leaders have to be
appropriate to the class. There have been cases where retired employees
who were deemed not to be appropriate class leaders to the current
employees in some class actions.
What Wal-Mart tried to do is to say: “We have 34,000 stores. We have
fourteen regions. We have all different categories of employees—you
cannot line up this massive group.” Again it is not because it is a million
and a half; because of the diversity of the purported class. You cannot
line up the class members with the class leaders and argue that there
was a common practice—that is issue one.
Issue two, which is going to be very interesting in this case, is the
role of statistics. The Supreme Court has accepted statistics and this
is a pattern or practice case, not a disparate impact case for those of
you taking it here.44 The Court addressed it as a pattern or practice case
yesterday—otherwise you are run into a problem depending on what
the District Court does on punitive damages. You cannot get punitive
damages in a disparate impact case.45 In talking about a pattern or
practice case, the question is the relevancy of the statistics. What an
employer would do is argue that the statistics were not relevant to the
argument of the class. They were not relevant in terms of, “Does it truly
represent the components of the class?” So you have that issue which
came up as well.
Now let me just finish by noting that these are going to be critical
issues. How the Court addresses these issues is going to be very
important. I think that you have to parse this in a whole lot of ways
because you have a chance for the employment laws to be rewritten in
many aspects.
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: Thank you. Fatima?
FATIMA GOSS GRAVES: Thanks to my colleagues for talking
about some of the history of Title VII because I do think it is important
to be in that context. I just wanted to clear up one thing that is true more
than anything. Title VII, when passed, included language about sex, but
the initial drafts and the ones that went to Committee did not constitute
sex. Sex was added as a reason for some to kill the bill, although others
were adding it with the hope that it would become law. In the end, it
did become law. And so it has been there from the beginning although,
how it has been applied in the Courts—particularly for women—has

44.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-430 (1971) (finding practices
and procedures neutral on their face cannot be maintained if the operate to “freeze the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices”).
45.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(b)(1) (limiting punitive damage awards to cases of
intentional discrimination, that is cases that do not rely on disparate impact theory).
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ebbed and flowed over time. The class vehicle is especially important
when you put it up against the equal where the sorts of classes that are
permitted under Title VII are not equal. You could see how it could be
more important. As my colleagues from the EEOC know, if this case
goes wrong there is a lot hanging on this.
The National Women’s Law Center submitted an amicus brief
in this case and we did so because we wanted to be included in
the record.46 I think at the argument yesterday and in some of the
briefs there has been a lot of blurring over what facts are actually
necessary at this stage. We are talking about the facts necessary to
demonstrate that these women have essentially enough in common
to proceed together. There are various arguments for how much they
had to show; what the standard of proof should be. Some of these
issues were never raised in argument but were thoroughly briefed
There are just a couple of things that I want to highlight. I definitely
thought that they would raise these points at the argument yesterday.
The first is the information that was presented around the fiscal
disparities both in pay and promotion. One of the questions that was
asked at the argument was, “Essentially are these statistics enough?”
47
There is lots of other evidence in the case, but if you brought a case
that said, “I can show that there is a policy that caused to women to
be paid less, promoted less and when promoted having to wait longer
for promotion, when you control for things such as job category,
sonority, performance and evaluation. Those are the sorts of things that
you would want a control for. If I can control all of those things and I
show that women are paid less and promoted less despite having better
performance value, is that sufficient to say that, “This common policy is
impacting women in particular?”
I don’t think there was a lot of time spent addressing this question.
This may in part be because there is always other evidence in the case
that the plaintiffs could put forward to try to show commonality. In
our brief, we focused both on the statistical disparities and why these
are important.48 We also focused on the other types of evidence since
the claim is that “Wal-Mart has a policy of allowing its managers to
46.
Brief for American Civil Liberties Union & National Women’s Law Center et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct.
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277), 2001 WL 805231 (arguing that gender discrimination in the
workplace, as alleged in the instant case, remains a national problem and class actions are
an appropriate means of addressing this issue)..
47.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977) (requiring
plaintiffs to present evidence of “gross statistical disparities” to meet their burden of proof
in a pattern or practice claim); see also Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 347-48 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (turning to “statistical significance” as the measuring rod in a pattern or practice
case when gross statistic evidence is not available).
48.
See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and National
Women’s Law Center, Wal-Mart Store, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (noting that
women working at Wal-Mart made 5% to 15% less than similarly situated men, even after
accounting for seniority, turnover, and performance).
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exercise the excessive amount of discretion in making chain promotion
decisions.” The plaintiffs brought in experts that tried to put it all
together to explain that when there is this type of discretion it can allow
managers to choose people for better pay and better promotions based
on simply who they like and who likes them, rather than anything related
to job performance.
This is not a new theory. There have been lots of cases including
Supreme Court cases that have dealt with this issue. If you look at some
of the previous cases there is a little confusion over whether this is a
new theory. And you know, one of the arguments is that it had to be an
entirely subjective policy versus an expressive subjective policy. The
idea [is] that there can be a policy of allowing managers to, basically,
choose people who they like and [the company does] not give them
enough guidance to ensure that [the managers] choose the person best
for the job, [with its] promotions or pay.
There was additional evidence presented that there were some sort
of common stereotypes. There were 100 sworn statements from the
women who talked about the types of things that were said to them by
managers that fall into the categories of women [who] are not working
for serious reasons, [arguing] that they are housewives, that they are
not breadwinners, and that they do not really need the moneyhome with
their children; do not need the promotion; and that it would entail travel.
Other comments by managers which I do not know exactly how it was
put, but were more denigrating to women as workers with names like
“Jennie Q” and “girls.” I honestly do not even know what “Jennie Q”
means.
At this point, the question is, “what do you need to show this sort of
cohesiveness that Llezlie spoke about at the class stage?” There is a lot
at stake. An immense amount of evidence is not available in many cases
and that it sounds meritorious takes discussion and is necessary before
you can even be certified. That is huge.
So I want to make sure I leave time for questions but I do not want to
go on and on. And I do want to talk more about the argument yesterday.
So I will stop here and let it go to Barbara.
BARBARA SLOAN: All right. I work for the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (“EEOC”) which is a federal agency.49 Thus,
the views expressed on this panel are mine alone, and do not reflect the
views of the EEOC or the Federal Governement. The EEOC is not part
of the Department of Justice. It is also not part of the Department of
Labor. We are supposed to be somewhat independent and not quite as
political as the Department of Labor. As Professor Ugelow stated that
49.
See Overview, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (describing the EEOC’s role in enforcing
federal laws which make it illegal to discriminate against an employee or job application
because of the person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, agem disability, or genetic
information).
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“there are rising costs” to bringing these kind of cases, we are a little
bit more even keeled as far as the kinds of cases we bring and the kinds
of arguments we make. They are not quite as political in the tone of
appeals as other agencies might be.
We can sue, and like many Federal agencies we can bring our own
suits that are EEOC versus the defendant. Under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act50 we can also sue state and local governments but
in the private sector we are limited to Title VII and the Americans with
Disabilities Act.51 We only have litigation authority with respect to the
private sector. So Wal-Mart would fall into our bailiwick and we have
had quite a number of cases against Wal-Mart. I work in the Appellate
Section so I litigate appeals in federal courts. I have worked on amicus
briefs in cases against Wal-Mart as well as in one of our suits against
Wal-Mart.
Because the EEOC is part of the govenment, we are not bound by
Rule 23. We can just sue. We do not have to show how they practice.
We do not have to show that the claim is typical of the class. So the WalMart case impacts us to the extent that the Court does want to blur the
merits and the class memberships—as this would directly impact our
class litigation.
The class issue will also impact us indirectly because we are teeny-tiny
agency. We have I think about 250 lawyers nationwide. My Appellate
unit has fifteen attorneys in total. One big case could require work by
our entire section of the agency. So the extent that the Wal-Mart case
adversely affects class actions would mean that suddenly we would
have to be the main agency involved in these class action cases.
We are confident that will not happen, and if it does, we had better get
some more money and some more people, because we really do rely on
private class actions for a large amount of the class enforcement. If the
Supreme Court does hit on the merits issues, the main things that will
affect us are if they decide on merit damages. That is something that will
come up in our cases—the formula type of relief that claimants were
arguing. This is the notion that we do not have to have many trials if we
find out if Wal-Mart is liable.
Specifically, when applied to the case at hand, [this] would mean
that all of these 1.5 million people, or however many that they turn out
to be, do not need to have a one-on-one mini trial with the Wal-Mart
attorney and a Wal-Mart defendant. If we can determine the relief by
looking at data from the databases we can compare it statistically with a
comparable man and find out whether women were underpaid, overpaid
or paid fairly. If they were underpaid, they would be entitled to a raise.
We use formula relief in many of our settlements, so to the extent that
the courts question about providing relief would impact us.

50.
51.

See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2008).
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2009).
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We would also be impacted by what Mr. Lorber said about statistics.
We use statistics in our big cases. There seems to be some concern
by [the] Supreme Court about whether you can, in fact, challenge
subjective employment practices—even though it has been forty years
since people have challenged this notion. Additionally, there seems to
be a question of whether subjectinve employment practices are limited
to just 23(b)(2) class actions or generally. That would be something for
the Court to decide.
CATHY VENTRELL-MONSEES: So we will say to you that we
expect a decision probably the last week of June. It is probably going to
be very mixed on a variety of basis. Susanna, I just want to thank [you]
for organizing the panel. Have a great afternoon. Thank you.
END TRANSCRIPT

